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Abstract 
This article assesses the impact of drug cartels in Mexico, a country that has witnessed an 
unprecedented expansion of cartels and wave of drug-related violence since mid-2000. Using 
the difference-in-difference kernel matching method, the article finds that the areas most 
plagued by drug-related violence suffered a steep decline in production, profits, salaries, the 
number of businesses and workers in manufacturing. Unemployment and poverty also rose in 
the most violent areas. The few areas where cartels managed to work free of drug-related 
killings failed to see a change in poverty or unemployment, contradicting anecdotal 
storytelling of cartels benefiting local economies. 
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Crime and violence are commonplace across many developing regions, particularly in Latin 
America currently holding the highest crime rate worldwide. In some instances, such as 
Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru drug cartels have contributed to both the high crime and 
violence rates. Cartels, apart from using gross violence to intimidate and punish rivals, are 
known to also corrupt state institutions and directly commit crimes against civilians such as 
extortions and kidnappings among others. Nowadays, Mexico is amongst the worst affected 
by drug violence. Until mid-2000, cartels had operated fairly peacefully in the country. But 
since then, when the government started prosecuting cartels with military force, cartels have 
been fighting fiercely for territory resulting in over 63,000 drug-related homicides just 
between 2006 and 2012.  Several Mexican cities have become prey to this wave of violence, 
and in some the overall death toll has been as high as in countries experiencing civil war 
(Molzahn et al., 2013). Despite the scale of the ongoing conflict, little is known about how 
families and businesses living in the crossfire have been affected.  
  The literature has thus far reported that crime, perceptions of safety and 
unemployment have worsened in areas where Mexican cartels have been fighting for turf 
(BenYishay and Pearlman, 2013; Robles et al., 2013; Calderón et al., 2015; Dell, 2015; 
Gutiérrez-Romero, 2016). Also, although the general migration from Mexico to the US has 
decreased, the opposite has been the case in border areas hit by drug violence (Ríos, 2014). 
Beyond these effects, not much is known about other important impacts that cartels have had.   
Another issue that remains largely unexplored is the potential benefit that cartels may bring; 
especially considering that cartels generate substantial profits, offer a broad range of jobs and 
do not always engage in battles for territory.  
 We contribute to the literature by analyzing the impact of Mexican drug cartels when they 
battle for territory and when they do not. Specifically, we examine the impact on industries 
where it is possible to identify, from economic census records, where production is taking 
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place at small-area-level. In particular, we analyze manufacturing, one of the biggest 
industries in Mexico, accounting for 35% of Gross Domestic Product. We also estimate the 
broad impact of cartels on poverty, inequality, unemployment and migration within the 
country using population censuses.  
We focus on assessing the impact on municipalities that experienced cartels or drug-
related homicides for the first time in 2006 or afterward. Our chosen period of analysis is not 
arbitrary. Although drug cartels have worked in Mexico for over a century, they have never 
covered the entire territory (Ríos, 2012). According to our estimates, right before 2005 drug 
cartels operated in about 20% of the 2,456 municipalities in the country (roughly half of those 
affected areas also experienced some low-level of drug-related homicides). In 2006, soon 
after the country started prosecuting drug leaders, cartels began expanding to new areas that 
had not experienced cartels or drug killings before. By 2010, cartels were operating in about 
40% of the municipalities (Coscia and Ríos, 2012; Molzahn et al., 2013; Reed, 2013). Thus, 
by estimating the impact in newly ‘conquered’ areas, one can gain valuable insights into the 
immediate effects of cartel presence and their violence. 
We identify the municipalities where cartels have been active, with and without drug-
related homicides, using the official records on the date, location and number of killings 
stemming from battles among cartels and with the state authority (SNSP, 2011). These 
records, also used by other recent studies, are unfortunately available only from December 
2006 until September 2011 (Calderón et al., 2015; Dell, 2015; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2016). 
Thus, for earlier periods we identify where cartels have been active by extensively surveying 
government reports, specialized blogs, national and international media.  
To estimate the impact of cartels we use the difference-in-difference kernel matching 
estimator as proposed by Heckman et al. (1998). Specifically, to evaluate the impact of drug 
cartels working ‘peacefully,’ we focus on municipalities that remained free of drug-related 
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homicides during the period 2000-2010. Among these areas, we estimate the change in 
outcomes before they had any cartels (2000-2005) and after cartels settled (in 2006 or 
afterward). We then compare the change in these outcomes to the ones experienced by similar 
municipalities free of cartels and drug-related homicides, which serve as our control group.  
Similarly, to assess the impact of drug-related homicides we focus on municipalities 
that remained free of cartels and drug-related homicides during 2000-2005. Among these 
areas, we estimate the change in outcomes before and after they experienced drug-related 
homicides for the first time in 2006 or afterward. We then compare that change in outcomes 
to the one experienced by areas free of cartels and drug-related homicides.  
Treated and control municipalities are matched based on their similar characteristics 
and probability of experiencing cartels and drug-related homicides. To identify the factors 
increasing the likelihood of areas experiencing cartels we follow the recent literature. These 
factors, described in detail in the next section, refer to the stricter policies imposed against 
cartels, municipalities’ socio-geographical characteristics and whether a municipality is ruled 
by a different political party than its state. This lack of political coordination has been found 
to be a decisive factor as to where cartels fight for territory (Castillo et al., 2012; Dell, 2015; 
Ríos, 2015). 
  We find neither poverty nor unemployment changed in areas where drug cartels 
worked ‘peacefully,’ that is free of drug-related homicides. Instead, there is plenty of 
evidence of the damaging effects of drug violence. For instance, areas with the highest rates 
of drug-related homicides experienced a decline in production, profits, salaries, number of 
establishments and workers in manufacturing, when compared to other similar areas yet not 
affected by the drug violence. The areas hardest hit by drug-related homicides also suffered 
an increase in poverty, unemployment, and changes in migration patterns, which suggests that 
people moved from more to less violent areas.  
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  All the evidence mentioned above refers only to the municipalities that experienced 
cartels or drug-related homicides for the first time in 2006 or afterward. As a robustness test 
we also analyze the impact on municipalities that were free of cartels and drug-related 
homicides during 1990-2000, but that experienced drug-related homicides for the first time 
during 2001-2005. These areas suffered a decline in the number of workers in manufacturing 
and a rise in poverty rates, relative to similar areas used as a control group. Both these 
impacts worsened even further during the period 2006-2010 when drug-related homicides 
severely intensified.   
  The article continues as follows. Section 2 describes the causes of the Mexican war on 
drugs. Section 3 describes the econometric method and databases used. Section 4 estimates 
the impact of cartels and drug-related homicides on poverty, inequality, migration and 
unemployment. Section 5 assesses the impact on manufacturing. Section 6 shows the 
robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The causes of Mexican drug violence 
Since the 1970s, the US has spent more than a trillion dollars trying to dismantle drug cartels 
in Latin America, thus far with limited impact other than fueling violence in the region (Huey, 
2014). For instance, during the 1980s the US focused on reducing coca production in Peru 
and Bolivia, back then the primary producers. The policy, although successful, displaced coca 
production to Colombia, which saw its worldwide coca production increasing from a mere 
10% to 90%. The war on drugs then shifted to combating the Colombian cartels. These cartels 
were dismantled, but they got fragmented into various small organizations amid a 20-year 
wave of drug violence that claimed over 15,000 lives, many victims of narco-terrorism (Huey, 
2014). Peru subsequently re-claimed its position as a global coca producer, while over 90% of 
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the cocaine that enters the US does it now through Mexico, amid unprecedented levels of 
drug-related violence. 
Mexico has trafficked illicit drugs, mostly to the USA, over the last century and 
without major episodes of violence until recently. The previous peaceful coexistence among 
cartels and the authorities was underpinned by the political system that prevailed in the 
country under the 70-year ruling of party the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Though 
elections were held regularly, the PRI kept the power across all spheres at federal, state and 
municipality level. This strong hegemony allowed cartels to establish broad agreements with 
state-member actors, and in exchange for bribes were allowed to work in certain areas and 
shipment routes, called plazas, while receiving protection from the army and police among 
others (Campbell, 2009).  
By the beginning of the new millennium, municipalities started for the first time to 
have a different political party than that of the state or federal administration.1 This lack of 
‘political coordination’ made it more difficult for cartels to carry on working in their plazas 
and agreed shipment routes. Cartels then had to establish new agreements with the new 
political actors, who could no longer guarantee protection as before. Cartels then resorted to 
arming themselves in a bid to defend their plazas and secure new ones, and this is one of the 
main reasons why a few clustered areas experienced about 6680 killings between 2000 and 
2005 (Ríos, 2015).  
PRI’s defeat in both the 2000 and 2006 presidential election to political party PAN 
was a major blow to the stabilizing and mediating role the state authority had played with 
organized crime. The victory of PAN’s presidential candidate, Felipe Calderón, was marred 
                                               
1 Ríos (2012) explains that 2,162 out of the 2,475 municipalities were ruled by the same party across all levels in 
1990. The number of municipalities sharing the same party across all government’s levels declined to 1,654 in 
1998 and to 1,433 in 2010. 
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by allegations of vote-rigging in 2006. To regain legitimacy, Calderón unexpectedly declared 
war on drug cartels and deployed the army into their hotspots (Ravelo, 2012). Soon after, an 
unprecedented wave of violence erupted. About 47,515 killings, mostly of cartel members, 
were officially attributed to the conflict among cartels and the state, just between December 
2006 and September 2011. These casualties represented half of all national homicides (as seen 
in Fig. A.1 in Appendix A). During this period, cartels also trebled and spread to new areas, 
given that some fractured into two or more over leadership disputes as their leaders got 
arrested or killed (Calderón et al., 2015).  
Several researchers argue that Calderón’s war on drugs was mostly responsible for the 
increase in both the drug violence and the number of cartels in Mexico (Guerrero-Gutiérrez, 
2011; Osorio, 2012; Dell, 2015; Shirk and Wallman, 2015).2 Municipalities ruled by the 
political party PAN became among the worst affected by drug violence, as these areas were 
more likely to implement Calderon’s policies against cartels (Dell, 2015). Dell estimates that 
cartel attempts to control new territories after the arrest or death of rival cartel leaders explain 
over 85% of the drug-related homicides. Because of these policies, cartels fragmented and 
spread to new territories, crucially to those which lacked political coordination –those 
municipalities ruled by a different political party than its state authority– (Ríos, 2015). The 
drug-related homicides also increased considerably in areas in close proximity to the USA 
border, the end point of the profitable drug market (Castillo et al., 2012). 
 
 
                                               
2 In 2006 Colombia also shifted its antidrug policy from attacking the drug production chain to seizing cocaine, 
intercepting drug shipments and destroying cocaine processing labs. This new Colombian strategy against cartels 
increased the price of cocaine in the USA, thus also contributing to some extent to the Mexican drug violence as 
cartels fought to secure the profitable market (Castillo et al., 2012).  
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2.1 Potential effects of drug cartels and drug violence 
Beyond trafficking illicit drugs, cartels are involved in at least 25 other illegal activities 
ranging from kidnapping, extortions, car theft to charging forced 'security and toll’ services 
(Ravelo, 2012). Gutiérrez-Romero (2016) using crime victimization surveys finds that 
households in the areas worst hit by drug violence spend 1,085 USD more on security than 
areas not affected by such violence.  The rise in these expenses is likely to have affected local 
businesses. They might have reduced their production or eventually fled the area, destroying 
jobs as has happened in other countries hit by drug-related conflict and acts of terrorism 
(Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Camacho and Rodriguez, 2013).  
Although the literature has reported some of the adverse effects stemming from drug 
violence, it is less clear the overall impact that drug cartels might have on local economies, 
especially considering that they do not always battle for turf. Mexican cartels make about $6.6 
billion in gross revenue just from exporting drugs to the US (Keefe, 2012).  Although most of 
these profits remain in offshore bank accounts, Ríos (2008) broadly estimates the illicit drug 
industry employs 468,000 people in Mexico, making it the fourth largest employer among all 
the main industries in the country.  
Anecdotal reports also suggest some areas have benefited from drug cartels. For 
instance, Marín (2002) recalls that he expected to find poverty and lack of infrastructure in his 
fieldwork in rural areas in Sinaloa, one of the Mexican states with the longest history in drug 
trafficking. He found the opposite. The farmers he interviewed recounted that, out of need, 
they chose to work for drug dealers as they pay in cash, and up to five years in advance. This 
evidence in Mexico matches to some extent the findings of Angrist and Kugler (2008) for 
Colombia. They report that coca production increases self-employment. Nonetheless, these 
apparent benefits are minor and offset by the violence associated with the coca production.  
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The recent expansion of cartels in Mexico provides a unique opportunity to estimate 
the immediate impact of cartels on local economies. To this end, we assess two types of 
impacts: of cartels working ‘peacefully’ free of drug-related homicides and of cartels  fighting 
for turf with reported drug-related homicides.  Specifically, we assess the effects that cartels 
and their associated violence have had on poverty, inequality, unemployment and migration 
within the country. To shed light on why these outcomes might have changed, we explore the 
impact on manufacturing, one of the biggest industries in the country. We also examine the 
impact on wholesale trade. Our main interest in examining this industry comes from the 
reports that suggest cartels are allegedly using legitimate wholesale trade businesses to 
legalize and send money from the US to Mexico. This is an apparent attempt to avoid using 
financial institutions that have been more severely scrutinized for money laundering (The 
Economist, 2014).3  
 
3. Econometric method 
Where cartels run their business ‘peacefully’ or fighting for territory is by no means random. 
Thus, to estimate the impact of drug cartels we cannot directly compare the outcomes of areas 
that have experienced drug cartels with those that have not.  Such direct comparisons might 
be misleading because the areas exposed to drug trafficking or drug-related killings are likely 
to have different characteristics to areas not exposed to such ‘treatments.’ Instead, we estimate 
                                               
3 Drug cartels are allegedly hiring brokers in the black US-peso exchange market to contact wholesale trade 
businesses that import and export goods. If a legitimate importer in Mexico wants to buy US dollars to buy say 
merchandise in the US, these dollars could be bought at preferred financial institution and then wired to the 
seller. The importer could also buy dollars at a cheaper rate in the black market. If this second option is chosen, 
brokers in the black market inform drug cartels when to pay the bill, in dollars, for the merchandise to the 
wholesale retailer. Then the importer in Mexico pays the agreed amount in pesos to the broker who, after taking 
a cut, passes the rest of the payment to the cartel in pesos (Mozingo et al., 2014).  
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the impact of drug cartels by combining two evaluation methods widely used in non-
randomized settings: propensity score matching with the difference-in-difference method. 4  
Propensity score matching serves two purposes. First, it helps to identify a suitable 
control group, in our case, areas that have not have experienced drug cartels or drug-related 
killing but with similar baseline characteristics to the areas affected. Second, once these 
control areas are identified, they are matched to areas affected by cartels, based on their 
likeness, to be able to make comparisons and estimate the average treatment effect. The unit 
of our analysis is at the municipality level, as we have information on where cartels have been 
active with and without killings at that small-area-level .  
We identify the control group by estimating the likelihood, namely the propensity 
scores pi, of a municipality i receiving treatment (Di=1) -experiencing drug trafficking or 
drug-related killing- conditional on a set of observable baseline characteristics Xi, as shown in 
Eq.(1).   
                                                  pi =pr(Di =1Xi)                                                          (1) 
Note that propensity score matching does not require everything in the information set 
Xi to be known. However, sufficient information is required to make the selection on 
observable assumption plausible (Todd, 2007). As just reviewed, previous literature has listed 
three key factors that make municipalities significantly more likely to experience drug cartels 
                                               
4 Dell (2015) instead uses regression discontinuity by comparing areas where PAN won and lost by a small 
margin. This method has the advantage of ensuring the areas compared are similar in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics. However, it has the disadvantage of remaining with few observations, 152 areas in 
total (out of the 2,456 in the country). Moreover, many of these areas had experienced cartels and drug-related 
homicides before Calderón took office (32 areas according to our surveyed records). Besides, roughly half of the 
controls, where the PAN lost, experienced drug-related homicides after Calderón took office. Thus, although this 
method is useful to analyze to what extent violence increased once Calderón took office, it is not suitable to 
assess the impact of areas experiencing drug violence or cartels for the first time. 
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and associated killings, and we use these to estimate the propensity scores. These are: whether 
the municipality was ruled by PAN, whether it had a different ruling party at state level when 
Calderón took office in 2006 and its proximity to the US border. We also consider other 
municipality characteristics that might have made them more vulnerable due to their socio-
economic setting. These are: population size; GDP per capita; percentage of people living in 
poverty; marginalization index5; percentage of children attending school; percentage of 
households receiving remittances; government subsidies received; whether urban, rural or 
mixed and past trends in overall homicide rates.  
The estimated propensity scores, pi, are then used to match treated areas to similar 
non-treated areas serving as controls. As standard in the literature, this matching is established 
by finding the region of common support.  That is the region where the distributions of 
propensity scores for the treated and control areas overlap. Any areas whose propensity score 
fall outside of this region of overlap get deleted from the analysis as it is not possible to make 
inferences for treated areas that have no suitable controls. Besides determining the overlap 
region, we also ensure the propensity scores and the covariates used in Xi have a similar 
distribution in the treated and the control groups. This so-called balancing property is tested 
by splitting the areas into blocks according to their propensity score and checking the 
treatment and control areas have no statistically significant differences.   
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that provided the treatment assignment strongly 
depends on observable baseline characteristics, denoted by Xi, and the balancing property is 
                                               
5 This index is composed by the percentage of population that cannot read or write, who are co-habiting in 
overcrowded conditions, living in a household without soil floor; living in areas of less than 5,000 inhabitants, 
earning up to two minimum salaries and who do not have complete primary, drainage,  bathroom, electricity, or 
piped water.  
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satisfied, then the difference in responses between the matched treated and control areas 
provides an unbiased estimate of the average treatment effect.  
All evaluation methods have risks for potential biases. In propensity score matching a 
concern is the possibility that systematic differences may remain between the matched treated 
and control areas. Such differences may arise if important unobserved characteristics 
influence selection into treatment. This potential bias could be lessened if the propensity score 
matching method is used in combination with other suitable observational methods (Gertler et 
al., 2011 p. 119).  
Specifically, we use the difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator, proposed 
by Heckman et al. (1998). This estimator obtains the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) by 
comparing the change in outcomes of treated municipalities, before and after cartels moved 
into these areas, our defined treatment, to the weighted change in outcomes of the 
municipalities used as control group, as in Eq. (2). Since this estimator compares the changes 
experienced by the treated areas to the one experienced by controls, any time-invariant 
characteristic that might have affected selection into treatment, whether observable or 
unobservable, gets canceled out. Hence, this estimator has been argued to convincingly 
address concerns with time-invariant unobserved characteristics affecting selection into 
treatment (Gertler et al., 2011 p.120). 6   



















ATE                            (2) 
where Y1 and Y0 are the outcomes of interest, such as poverty, for the treated i and control j 
areas. t’ and t denote the pre- and post-treatment periods. n1 and n0 represent the size of the 
                                               
6 Similarly, Gutiérrez-Romero (2016) used the difference-in-difference method combined with instrumental 
variables. She used as an instrument whether the municipality and state shared the same political party, as a 
measure of political coordination. We include this variable in the estimation of the propensity score along other 
geographical and socio-economic characteristics.  
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treatment and control group, both in the region of common support. The kernel weighting 
function, W(i, j) shown in Eq. (3), gives more weight to control municipalities that have 
propensity scores more similar to those of treated areas and down-weight more distant 
observations.7   





























jiW                                                                (3) 
where G(·) denotes the kernel function. an is a bandwidth parameter, and  pi is the propensity 
score of treated areas.  pj and pk are the propensity scores of municipalities in the control 
group. 
Note that in the difference-in-difference estimator the change that the control areas 
experienced (Y0tj - Y0t’j) is used as the counterfactual as to what would have happened to the 
treated areas had they not been affected by cartels. In practice, we cannot observe such 
counterfactual, but there are two ways to judge the validity of such a hypothetical scenario, as 
described next.  
An underlying assumption of this counterfactual is that without the treatment, the 
changes experienced by the treated and control areas would have increased or decreased at the 
same rate. Hence, it is possible to assess the validity of this assumption, known as the parallel 
trend in the absence of treatment, by comparing if before the treatment began the treated and 
control areas experienced similar changes. As shown in the next section, the outcomes in the 
matched treated and control areas moved in tandem across various indicators before the 
treatment began. Thus, gaining confidence that the outcomes would have continued to move 
                                               
7 An advantage of kernel matching over other matching methods, such as nearest neighborhood or radius 
matching, is that it pairs each treated area to more than one control area, thereby using more observations and 
reducing the estimation’s variance (Guo and Fraser, 2010, p. 245). 
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in parallel had the treatment not been implemented. The similarity found in past trends is 
perhaps not too surprising. The treated and control areas being compared have been matched 
on the basis of their similarity in baseline characteristics, thus yielding very similar parallel 
trends in outcomes before the treatment began.8 
As in other evaluation methods, a tacit assumption in the difference-in-difference’s 
counterfactual is that other than the treatment itself, there should be no other factors affecting 
the treatment and control groups differently. A violation of this assumption might occur if, for 
instance, families living in areas hit by the drug-related violence received extra financial 
support. To consider this possibility we estimate the kernel matching difference-in-difference 
estimator in two basic forms. In the first form, we do not control for any other covariate, as 
shown in Eq. (2). In the second, our preferred choice, we control for covariates that might 
have changed over time, rit, and that as a result might have influenced outcomes.  To add 
these time-varying covariates, rit, we re-express the difference-in-difference kernel matching 
estimator in regression form, as shown in Eq. (4). This regression is estimated using a 
weighted panel fixed effects at the municipality level. Note that before running this 
regression, the propensity scores are estimated to determine the region of common support 
and test the balancing property. These propensity scores are then used in the panel fixed 
effects regression to weight the control municipalities using the kernel matching function   
W(i, j) shown earlier in equation (3). 
                      itiitititit rTreatmentPostTreatmentPostY   4321 )*(            (4) 
                                               
8 Comparing absolutely all treated and non-treated municipalities in the country using exclusively the difference-
in-difference method is likely to yield biased estimates as these groups of areas exhibit quite different trajectories 
in past outcomes, such as poverty, deprivation and homicides. We only achieve parallel trends in these past 
outcomes between these groups if the difference-in-difference method is combined with propensity score 
matching, another advantage of combining these methods. 
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where Yit is the outcome of interest for municipality i at time t (t=0 before, and t=1 after 
treatment). Postt is the post-treatment dummy variable. Treatmenti is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for treated and 0 for the control municipalities. Thus, the regression coefficient 3 
measures the average treatment effect, that is the difference-in-difference kernel matching 
impact.  µi refers to the area (municipality) fixed effect and it represent the residuals. Time-
varying variables, rit, include the growth in remittances and poverty-relief subsidies per 
capita, both at the municipality level. We also consider the regional labor market, using the 
unemployment rate. We use the unemployment at state and not municipality level as people 
living in municipalities affected by drug violence might still find jobs in nearby non-treated 
areas within the same state. To avoid endogeneity issues with the intensity of drug-related 
violence all variables in rit are lagged by two years. It is worth noting that the estimated 
average treatment effects are reasonably consistent when estimated with and without the time-
varying variables rit. This suggests that the observed differences in outcomes after the 
treatment began are likely to stem mainly from the treatment received. 
 
3.1 Data  
We use the official statistics by the Mexican government on the casualties credited to the 
conflict among cartels and the state (SNSP, 2011). This dataset is available at small-area level 
(municipality) and only from December 2006 until September 2011. For earlier periods 
without such records, we identify which areas experienced cartels or drug-related homicides 
by searching online government bulletins, media reports and specialized blogs.  Appendix B 
describes in detail how we searched extensively for these reports, as well as how our findings 
match those of other similar studies. 
Appendix C describes all the indicators used to measure the impact on poverty, 
inequality, migration and unemployment rates at municipality level, which are derived from 
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population censuses. To measure the impact on manufacturing and wholesale industry we use 
the available economic censuses where it is possible to assess where the production is taking 
place at municipality level.  
 
3.2. Selection of treatment and control groups 
3.2.1. Impact of drug-cartels: Treatment group  
To measure the impact of drug cartels when working ‘peacefully’, we define the treatment 
group as follows. Areas free of drug-related homicides during 2000-2010, but where cartels 
moved into and did so for the first time between December 2006 and December 2010. We 
limit the analysis up until 2010 given that it is the latest year for which we have population 
census records publically available. 
 
3.2.2. Impact of drug-homicides: Treatment group  
To measure the impact of drug-related homicides, we redefine our treatment group. This 
consists of areas that were free of cartels and drug-related homicides during 2000-2005, but 
that suffered at least one drug-related homicide for the first time between December 2006 and 
December 2010, according to official records. During this period there were 34,612 drug-
related homicides. This homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants by municipalities ranged from 
as low as 0.080 to as high as 1,565 killings. That is a large variance in the intensity of killings. 
Thus, besides estimating the impact among all areas that experienced at least one drug-related 
homicide, we also estimate the impact of drug violence by splitting areas according to their 
level of violence. Specifically, we divide treated municipalities into quartiles, according to 
their drug-related homicides rates.9 
                                               
9 Given the regional differences in economic development and drug-related homicides we did various alternative 
sub-divisions. For instance, we also divided areas affected by drug related violence such that those located in the 
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3.2.3. Defining the control group 
For each of the two treatment groups mentioned above, we draw their respective control 
group from the same pool of municipalities that remained free of cartels and drug-related 
homicides during 2000-2010. Although drawn from the same pool, each treatment group is 
matched to its respective control group based on propensity score matching. This ensures the 
matched areas have on average the same characteristics and propensity of being treated.  
We cannot ignore that some areas in the control group are near to those experiencing 
drug violence. Such closeness could bias (downwards) our impact estimates. To lessen this 
potential bias, we exclude control areas located within 10 kilometers of the epicenter of areas 
that experienced drug-related homicides during 2000-2010. In this way, the remaining control 
areas are still near enough to the treated areas to serve as proxies of the labor market 
conditions of the affected areas; yet, far enough to avoid spill-over effects.10  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
north were compared exclusively to controls also located in the north, and vice versa for those affected areas in 
the south. For instance, from the first, second and third quartiles of drug-related homicides and their respective 
control groups, we removed municipalities located in southern states (Campeche, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana 
Roo, Tabasco, Yucatan). From the bottom quartile and its respective control group (mostly located in the south) 
we removed municipalities in northern states (Baja California, Baja California  Sur, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo 
Leon, Sinaloa, Sonora and Tamaulipas). These alternative sub-divisions yield a much smaller number of treated 
and controls yet they produce remarkably similar results to those presented here, thus we omit them (but are 
available upon request).  
10 As a robustness check we also excluded buffer areas within 15, 20 and 30 kilometers, finding very similar 
results to those when removing buffer areas within a radius of 10 kilometers from the of the epicenter of areas 
affected by drug-related homicides. Given the consistency of results we only present the results of removing 
areas within 10 kilometers, given that removing areas within a wider radius quickly shrinks the size of the 
control group. For instance, removing buffer areas within a radius of 20 kilometers halves the number of control 
areas and removing those within a radius of 40 kilometers shrinks the control group by more than 90%.  
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3.3 Propensity score matching for 2006-2010 post-treatment 
Table A.1 shows the probit regressions coefficients, as marginal effects, for the two types of 
treatments analyzed: areas with cartels working ‘peacefully,’ and those with drug-related 
homicides. We also run separate probit regressions for each of the quartiles affected by drug-
related homicides (columns 3-6).11 The bottom of Table A.1 shows the total number of areas 
considered in the treated and control groups and the number of areas that were actually 
matched as they remained in the region of common support. Given that we discard areas that 
fall outside that region of common support, as is standard in the literature, the size of the 
quartile affected by drug-related homicides differs slightly. 
The distribution of estimated propensity scores for each of the treated and control 
groups considered overlap well (Fig. A.2). As shown in Fig. A.3. the top quartile has a much 
higher average drug-related homicide rate (154) than the rest of the areas put together (13.2).  
Fig. 1 illustrates the 68 municipalities that experienced drug cartels yet remained free 
of drug-related homicides. It is worth noting, that the great majority of these areas have only 
one drug cartel, thus being free of rivals and avoiding confrontations. This figure also shows 
the 403 matched areas used as a control group, which are in the proximity of the treated areas. 
Fig. 2 shows the 613 municipalities that experienced at least one drug-related 
homicide and the matched 553 control areas. Although the areas with the highest levels of 
drug-related killings tend to be located in the north, those in the centre and south have also 
been affected by such violence. This figure also shows that the controls used are well 
scattered around municipalities experiencing drug-related killings. 
                                               
11 We used roughly the same set of covariates to estimate the propensity score for each of these quartiles. 
However, we varied it slightly to ensure the estimated scores satisfy the balancing property within the region of 
common support.   
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The matched treated and control areas have no significant differences in the variables 
used to estimate the propensity scores (Table A.2). The descriptive statistics for the matched 
treated and control municipalities are quite similar before treatment began, without having 
any statistically significant differences, as shown in Table A.3. This table also presents the 
difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator without controlling for any covariates as in 
Eq. (2). These results broadly agree with those estimated with controls as shown in Tables (1) 
and (2). 
Having calculated the propensity scores, we compare the matched treated and control 
areas using the Epanechnikov kernel matching method, with a bandwidth of 0.06. As 
mentioned earlier, for the difference-in-difference’s counterfactual to be reliable and yield an 
unbiased estimate of the treatment effect, it requires that the matched areas -treated and 
controls- to have parallel trends in outcomes before treatment began. Fig. A.4, A.5 and A.6, 
show the control and treated areas had similar trajectories in poverty levels, index of 
marginalization and overall homicides rates before 2006. However, after that, the tandem in 
trajectories starts falling apart. That is particularly evident for the homicide rates. Take for 
instance Fig. A.4, Panel B, which shows the homicide rates for the municipalities that 
experienced drug-related homicides for the first time in 2006 or afterward, and its respective 
controls. Before 2006, the treated and controls had parallel trajectories in overall homicide 
rates. This trajectory breaks down in 2006 with homicides rates spiking in the treated areas to 
levels not seen before, which contributed to the sharp increase in the national average 
homicide rates. The official rates for drug-related killings over 2006-2010, also shown in Fig. 
A.4 Panel B, suggest that the sharp increase in the national average homicides and in the 




4. Impact on local economy 
Having checked the robustness of the matched treated and control areas, we move on to 
estimate the difference-in-difference kernel matching regression, as shown earlier in Eq. (4).   
 
4.1 Impact on inequality and poverty  
Comparing the mid-2005 census to the population census of 2010, we find that areas where 
cartels worked ‘peacefully,’ free of drug-related homicides, experienced a decline in 
inequality, measured by the Gini index, relative to their control group. Could this decrease in 
inequality be the result of some low-income families benefiting from drug cartels? It is 
unlikely, as these areas experienced no change in poverty rates (Table 1 Panel A, columns 1-
4).  
A different picture emerges for the areas affected by drug-related homicides (Table 1, 
Panel B). These areas experienced no change in inequality, relative to their control group. 
However, poverty increased in the areas with the highest rate of drug-related homicides, those 
in the top quartile. Specifically, food poverty -which measures the percentage of the 
population without enough income to buy a basic food basket- increased by 2.5 percentage 
points in these areas. Similarly, capability poverty, -which adds those who cannot cover their 
health and education needs- increased by 2.8 percentage points as a result of this drug 
violence. 
 
4.2 Impact on migration and population size 
Areas where drug cartels worked ‘peacefully,’ free of drug-related homicides, suffered no 
change in population size or migration patterns (Tables 1 and 2, Panel A). Once again, a 
different picture emerges for the areas affected by drug violence. The most violent areas, 
those in the top two quartiles, suffered a decline in the number of people who migrated from 
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other Mexican states with higher homicide rates (Table 1 column 6, Panel B). In contrast, the 
total number of immigrants, increased in the areas with the least drug-related homicides, in 
the first quartile (Table 2, column 1). The large increase in immigrants in these areas helps to 
explain why their net population rose, relative to their control group (Table 1, column 5, Panel 
B).  
Overall, these migration patterns suggest drug violence displaced people from more to 
less violent places. It is nonetheless unclear why people migrated in higher proportion to areas 
with low levels of drug-related homicides, instead of controls free of drug-related homicides. 
One possibility is that the controls, free of drug-related homicides, might be slightly more 
distant, thus proving problematic and more expensive to move to. Unfortunately, the 
population census does not provide information of the municipality where people were living 
previously. Thus it is impossible to measure the exact distance that people migrated. 
However, with the information available it is possible to establish that nearly 90% of people 
who migrated did so within the same state of current residency, so likely to nearby areas. Due 
to an array of issues, people might have preferred moving within the same state, rather than to 
other more distant spatial clusters. People might prefer to remain close to their families, 
having similar access to labor markets and schools. Overall, then, it might be more 
convenient, and cheaper, to migrate to nearby areas with low-intensity of drug violence, than 
to others free of drug killings that are more distant. We find some evidence that the cost of 
migration might have played a role. For instance, the least violent areas, the bottom quartile, 
overall attracted more immigrants with low-earnings than high-earnings (Table 2 columns 2 





4.3 Impact on unemployment  
To assess the impact on unemployment, unlike previous studies, we use population censuses 
instead of labor surveys, to ensure that the data are representative at municipality level, the 
focus of our analysis. Using census records, unfortunately, comes at a cost, as unemployment 
rates are unavailable for the 2005 mid-census. Thus, we look at changes in unemployment 
rates by comparing the population census of 2000 and 2010.  
There is no evidence that unemployment rates changed in areas where cartels were 
active free of drug-related homicides (Table 2 columns 4-6, Panel A). In contrast, in the most 
violent areas, those in the top two quartiles, unemployment rates increased among people with 
high- and low-education attainment (Panel B).12  
 
5. Impact of cartels on industries 
This section evaluates the impact of cartels on manufacturing and wholesale trade. Using 
economic census data at municipality level, for each industry we examine the overall 
production, profits, salaries per worker, number of establishments and workers per 10,000 
inhabitants.13  
The economic censuses used were conducted between 1 January to 31 December of 
2003 and 2008 respectively. These censuses were carried out in different years to the 
population ones used earlier, thus, we slightly redefine the post-treatment period, spanning 
now from December 2006 until December 2008. We focus on areas that experienced cartels 
or drug-related homicides for the first time in 2006 or until 2008. As before, we also split 
                                               
12 In these areas, we do not find a change in overall unemployment rates, nonetheless this might be because the 
overall unemployment rates also include the population of working age that did not state their educational 
background. 
13 We do not analyze other industries, such as construction and finance where cartels are rumored to launder their 
money, because the censuses do not distinguish in which areas their production took place. 
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these areas, but now according to their drug-related homicide rate during 2006-2008. Since 
we redefine the span of our post-treatment, we now use as controls those areas free of cartels 
and drug-related homicides during 2000-2008. We also exclude from this group areas within 
10 kilometers of those that experienced at least one drug-related homicide during 2000-2008.  
By shortening the period of analysis, we miss two years where drug violence was 
intense 2009-2010. However, analyzing the impact of cartels on industries until the end of 
2008 offers an important advantage. That is, we avoid assessing these impacts during the 
whole duration of the US recession period, during which Mexican exports decreased. 
 
5.1. Propensity score matching for 2006-2008 post-treatment 
We re-estimate the propensity scores to redefine the period of post-treatment. Table A.4 
shows the results of the probit regressions as marginal effects. All estimated scores satisfy the 
balancing property and their distributions overlap well between the treatment and control 
groups (as seen in Table A.5 and Fig. A.7). Table A.6 shows the broad descriptive for the 
matched areas, and the difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator obtained without 
controls.  
After matching the treatment and control areas, we obtain the difference-in-difference 
kernel estimator using the panel fixed effects regression shown in Eq. (4).  
 
5.2. Impact on manufacturing 
Manufacturing was affected in areas that experienced drug-related homicides, and the impact 
was more extensive in areas with more drug killings (Table 3, Panel B, Columns 1-5). For 
instance, the areas in the first two quartiles experienced a decline in salaries per paid worker. 
Areas in the third quartile also experienced a decline in salaries, and a decline in profits, and 
the number of workers. The areas in the top quartile, besides their decline in salaries, profits 
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and number of workers, also experienced a decrease in production and the number of 
establishments per 10,000 inhabitants.   
In sum, although with some differences in magnitude, salaries declined in every single 
quartile of areas experiencing drug-related homicides. This evidence supports the findings of 
Velásquez (2014) who using a panel survey shows earnings fell in areas with the highest 
overall homicide rates in Mexico, ignoring whether the homicides were drug-related or not. 
Thus, violence is likely to have increased the costs of doing business, such as insurance 
premiums, as has happened in other countries experiencing prolonged waves of violence and 
terrorism (Sandler and Enders, 2008). Our evidence is also consistent with the findings of 
Collier and Duponchell (2013), who show firms located in areas experiencing conflict end up 
hiring fewer workers and paying lower salaries.  
Another relevant finding is the decline in salaries in areas where drug cartels were 
active and free of drug-related homicides (Table 3, Panel A, column 4). These areas remained 
with an overall homicide rate below that of national average (Fig. A.4, Panel A). So, the mere 
presence of cartels seems to have increased business costs thereby affecting salaries. These 
extra costs might stem from the instances or expectation of kidnappings and extortions 
targeted at businesses (Ravelo, 2012). 
 
5.3. Impact on wholesale trade  
We move on to analyze the impact on wholesale trade. Across the five statistics analyzed, 
none were negatively affected by the presence of cartels or by drug-related homicides (Table 
3 in columns 6 to 10). 
It is unclear why the wholesale trade industry was left unaffected by cartels even in 
the areas severely affected by drug violence. One possibility, is that wholesale trade 
businesses strongly depend on local markets, so they might be unable to outsource production 
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or sales to other areas as easily as manufacturing. Also, we cannot ignore that cartels are 
allegedly using businesses in this industry as a façade for money laundering and to distribute 
illicit drugs (Proceso, 2014). Thus, we can only speculate that this could be another reason 
why this industry remained unaffected.   
 
6. Robustness tests 
6.1. Placebo tests (using 1990-2000 as pre-treatment vs. 2001-2005 as post-treatment)  
We use a series of placebo tests, as is commonly done in the evaluation literature, to rule out 
the possibility that the impacts reported thus far occurred by pure chance. These placebo tests 
assume that municipalities were affected by cartels or drug-related homicides earlier than they 
were. Specifically, we assume the pre-treatment period dates back to 1990-2000, and the post-
treatment refers to 2001-2005 (instead of 2006 or afterward). For these placebo tests, we use 
as control group the same areas as in sections 4 and 5 respectively. We also use propensity 
score matching to ensure the matched control and placebo treatment areas have the same 
distribution of baseline characteristics. 
 Table A.7 shows the results of the placebo tests for the main statistics of poverty, 
inequality, and migration. In these placebo tests, we cannot compare the impact on changes in 
unemployment rate and some migration patterns as these statistics are not available in the 
mid-census of 2005. Nonetheless, from all the placebo difference-in-difference kernel 
matching estimates presented, none are statistically significant at the 10% significance level. 
Table A.8 shows the placebo estimates for the manufacturing and wholesale trade industries. 
From the 60 placebo difference-in-difference kernel matching estimates presented, only one is 
statistically significant at the 10% significance level.  
In sum, the placebo tests suggest the impacts showed earlier are unlikely to be driven 
by chance or unobserved characteristics. 
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6.2. Impact on areas that experienced drug-related homicides since 2001 
As mentioned earlier, there was some low-scale drug-related violence during 2001-2005. The 
areas affected by violence during this earlier period were dropped from the analysis presented 
thus far. Here, we focus on estimating the impact on these areas first affected by drug 
violence, which might provide additional evidence on how cartels affect local economies. To 
this end, we redefine our treatment group as areas that were free of cartels and drug-related 
homicides during 1990-2000, but that experienced drug-related homicides for the first time 
during 2001-2005. The control group is composed of areas that at no point experienced cartels 
or drug-related homicides during 1990-2010. 
Once again, we identify the areas where cartels were active with and without drug-
related homicides in this earlier period by surveying government bulletins and online media 
reports. There are no official records to determine the exact intensity of drug killings for this 
earlier period. Thus, when estimating the impact of drug-related homicides we analyze all 
these areas as one group, without subdividing them into quartiles according to their intensity 
of drug violence. Again we use the difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator. We 
use roughly the same covariates as before to estimate the propensity score, but now lagged for 
our new baseline period 2000.1 In Fig. A.8 we show the matched treatment and control areas, 
which satisfy the region of common support. These matched areas had parallel trends in both 
homicides rates and poverty statistics before the violence erupted among cartels as seen in 
Fig. A.9. 
Table 4 shows the areas first affected by drug-related homicides during 2001-2005 had 
an increase in the percentage of people living in food poverty, relative to their control group 
and the baseline year (2000).  These areas affected by drug violence also experienced a 
decrease in the number of businesses and workers in manufacturing, relative to their control 
group. The impact on salaries among these areas has a negative sign, though not statistically 
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significant (thus this finding is omitted). This lack of statistical significance might be because 
of the small sample and low intensity of drug-related homicides, as well as kidnappings, in 
this earlier period.  
These areas also suffered an increase in poverty when the statistics for the year 2000 
are compared against 2010. During that period, the number of workers in manufacturing also 
declined further. These impacts reflects that about 90% of the areas first affected by violence 
during 2001-2005 also experienced drug-related homicides in 2006 or after, when the number 
of drug killings considerably intensified. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This article estimated some of the impacts that drug cartels and their associated violence have 
had on local economies in Mexico. To this end, we used the difference-in-difference kernel 
matching method, finding that drug-related violence has displaced people from more to less 
violent areas. Areas with the highest levels of drug-related homicides experienced the biggest 
impact on poverty and overall changes in the manufacturing industry. The manufacturing 
industry in these areas suffered a sharp decline in production, profits, salaries, the number of 
establishments and workers (compared to other similar areas not affected by the violence). 
While uncovering some of the negative sides of the drug violence, we found no major benefits 
in areas where drug cartels operated ‘peacefully’, that is, free of drug-related homicides. In 
these areas, we found no major impacts from cartels other than also experiencing a decline in 
salaries in manufacturing. This suggests that the mere presence of cartels increases businesses 
costs, perhaps as a result of an (expected) rise in cartels’ extortions.  
 Our findings then contradict anecdotal storytelling of cartels benefiting the local 
economies where they operate. In contrast, the evidence presented suggests that cartels 
presence whenever associated with a steep increase of drug related violence affects severely 
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municipalities’ socio-economic life.  Overall these findings deepen our understanding of the 
effects that drug cartels have on development when engaging in violence and not, hence have 
important implications for policy making. Although this evidence refers only to Mexico, the 
findings may well be relevant to other similar countries at risk of falling prey to the ever-
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Fig. 1 Municipalities where cartels started operating for the first time in 2006 or after without drug-




Fig. 2 Municipalities that experienced at least one drug-related homicides for the first time in 2006 





Table 1  
Impact of cartels and drug-related homicides on poverty, inequality and migration 
 









Number of people that 
resided in another state with 
more homicides 5 years 
ago per 10,000 inhabitants
Panel A: Since 2006 cartels moved into area without experiencing drug related homicides
Areas experienced peaceful cartels 
Difference-in-difference -3.573 -3.644 -2.829 -1.681*** -650.494 2.288
(2.812) (2.949) (2.665) (0.607) (523.516) (5.097)
Observations 942 942 942 942 942 942
Panel B: Since 2006 cartels moved into area experiencing drug related homicides
All areas that experienced at least one drug related homicide 
Difference-in-difference -0.536 -0.476 -0.204 0.367 883.434 -9.577***
(0.985) (1.084) (1.174) (0.385) (560.685) (3.127)
Observations 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,482 2,486 2,486
Fourth quartile (with most drug-related homicides)
Difference-in-difference 2.549* 2.780* 2.632 0.161 214.832 -29.887***
(1.365) (1.534) (1.692) (0.517) (364.681) (6.206)
Observations 1,426 1,426 1,426 1,424 1,426 1,426
Third quartile 
Difference-in-difference -0.954 -1.064 -1.082 -0.004 113.734 -11.133**
(1.305) (1.433) (1.500) (0.514) (448.762) (4.595)
Observations 1252 1252 1252 1252 1252 1252
Second quartile 
Difference-in-difference -1.711 -1.401 -0.157 0.116 544.284 -3.464
(1.529) (1.654) (1.711) (0.524) (664.601) (4.789)
Observations 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076
First quartile 
Difference-in-difference 2.307 2.559 2.400 -0.250 4,363.480** 0.437
(1.970) (2.044) (1.867) (0.622) (2,028.167) (4.196)
Observations 574 574 574 574 574 574  
The difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator compares each treated group to its respective matched control group using the panel fixed regression 
shown in Eq.(4). Controls used in all specifications: poverty-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Food poverty measures the percentage of the population 
without enough income to buy a basic food basket.  Capability poverty, adds those who cannot cover their health and education needs. Patrimony poverty, 
adds those who cannot cover clothing, housing and public transport needs. Sources: Poverty and Gini estimated by CONEVAL, population census and 
controls INEGI.  
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Table 2 
Impact of cartels and drug-related homicides on migration and unemployment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total number of 
migrants that moved 
into 2000 vs 2010a
Number of people that 
moved in and had less 
earning income than non-
migrant population 2000 
vs 2010a
Number of people that 
moved in and had more 
earning income than non-
migrant population 2000 vs 
2010a
Unemployment 
rate 2000 vs 2010
Unemployment rate 
low educated 2000 
vs 2010a
Unemployment rate 
high school plus 
2000 vs 2010a
Panel A: Since 2006 cartels moved into area without experiencing drug related homicides
Areas experienced peaceful cartels 
Difference-in-difference -47.297 -50.370 4.477 -0.287 0.325 0.394
(48.825) (46.871) (6.467) (0.435) (0.545) (0.393)
Observations 923 921 497 934 934 934
Panel B: Since 2006 cartels moved into area experiencing drug related homicides
All areas that experienced at least one drug related homicide 
Difference-in-difference 114.040* 99.154* 18.397** -0.230 0.239 0.669**
(63.106) (57.051) (8.624) (0.295) (0.332) (0.283)
Observations 2,441 2,439 1,601 2,470 2,470 2,470
Fourth quartile (with most drug-related homicides)
Difference-in-difference -1.795 -3.777 -1.093 0.500 1.032** 1.282***
(19.303) (18.234) (3.593) (0.381) (0.482) (0.387)
Observations 1,387 1,385 749 1,418 1,418 1,418
Third quartile 
Difference-in-difference 27.497 25.568 2.472 0.021 0.937* 0.770**
(41.135) (38.797) (6.219) (0.383) (0.548) (0.306)
Observations 1,224 1,222 702 1,245 1,245 1,245
Second quartile 
Difference-in-difference 57.791 42.028 13.096 -0.567 -0.045 0.434
(46.533) (42.296) (8.875) (0.404) (0.440) (0.354)
Observations 1,059 1,057 635 1,068 1,068 1,068
First quartile 
Difference-in-difference 485.239* 419.622* 76.804** -0.515 -0.298 0.431
(279.017) (248.957) (37.033) (0.414) (0.556) (0.393)
Observations 557 557 425 562 562 562  
 
The difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator compares each treated group to its respective matched control group using the panel fixed regression 
shown in Eq.(4). Controls used in all specifications: poverty-relief subsidies per capita and state’s unemployment rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
clustered at municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Sources: a Own estimates using the micro-data population sample from census records, 






Impact of drug cartels and drug-related homicides on manufacturing and wholesale trade 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
production 
thousand USD
profit    
thousand USD
























Panel A: Since 2006 cartels moved into area without experiencing drug related homicides
Areas experienced peaceful cartels 
Difference-in-difference -1,363.312 -5,823.237 -52.038 -0.560** 1.073 1,748.436 982.308 3.067 0.327 0.203
(29,712.821) (8,814.123) (41.796) (0.219) (3.460) (1,422.953) (902.455) (7.853) (0.586) (0.768)
Observations 996 996 996 996 996 996 996 996 996 996
Panel B: Since 2006 cartels moved into area experiencing drug related homicides
All areas that experienced at least one drug related homicide -24,388.032* -10,031.096* -34.889** -0.468** -0.912 1.853 69.978 -4.001 0.085 -0.290
Difference-in-difference (14,328.420) (5,446.402) (15.929) (0.226) (1.774) (450.237) (388.513) (2.627) (0.334) (0.354)
2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562
Observations
Fourth quartile (with most drug-related homicides)
Difference-in-difference -25,696.772* -6,053.516** -62.342** -0.645* -8.714** -90.601 15.728 2.309 0.789 -0.623
(13,132.072) (3,082.142) (26.530) (0.338) (3.512) (304.897) (302.451) (3.528) (0.614) (0.701)
Observations 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820 1,820
Third quartile 
Difference-in-difference -3,885.785 -9,448.145*** -34.794** -0.429** 2.261 -525.280 -830.298 -0.554 -0.055 0.275
(17,877.384) (3,542.147) (16.474) (0.217) (3.003) (955.819) (863.292) (3.225) (0.348) (0.677)
Observations 1,884 1,884 1,884 1,884 1,884 1,884 1,884 1,884 1,884 1,884
Second quartile 
Difference-in-difference -35,082.980 -5,468.287 -15.147 -0.629* 1.491 1,960.185 2,082.901* -6.954 -0.137 -0.599
(32,717.286) (11,584.091) (24.320) (0.335) (2.523) (1,600.229) (1,205.671) (4.419) (0.337) (0.488)
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010
First quartile 
Difference-in-difference 10,607.423 2,272.004 -51.304 -0.623* 3.257 799.861 -938.371 -7.308 0.984 0.488
(69,131.916) (24,039.135) (41.592) (0.345) (3.395) (2,168.080) (2,333.690) (5.069) (0.619) (0.642)




The difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator compares each treated group to its respective matched control group using the panel fixed regression 
shown in Eq.(4). Controls used in all specifications: Poverty-relief subsidies per capita, growth in annual remittances and state’s unemployment rate, all 
lagged for two years. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Source: economic census and 
controls used INEGI. 
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Table 4 
Impact on municipalities that experienced drug-related homicides during 2001-2010 






























Difference-in-difference 3.369* 2.694 0.999 -0.00777 19.940 -72.348* -5.951** 2.983** 2.934** 2.286* -0.00227 201.2 -57.563** -0.00628
(0.0956) (0.187) (0.594) (0.357) (0.972) (42.429) (2.837) (0.0340) (0.0305) (0.0745) (0.773) (0.860) (28.740) (0.991)
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Changes 2000 vs. 2010Changes 2000 vs. 2005
 
The difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator compares each treated group to its respective matched control group using the panel fixed regression 
shown in Eq.(4). Controls used in all specifications: poverty-relief subsidies per capita, and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for 1998 and 2002. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses clustered at municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Food poverty measures the percentage of the population 
without enough income to buy a basic food basket.  Capability poverty, adds those who cannot cover their health and education needs. Patrimony poverty, 


































Probit marginal effects: Propensity scores used to evaluate impact on welfare statistics  
 
Cartels but no 
drug-related 
homicides
At least one 
drug-related 
homicide 4th Quartile 3rd Quartile 2nd Quartile 1st Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index of marginalization 2000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Capability poverty 2000 -0.011** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.005 0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.000)
Food poverty 2000 0.009** 0.020** 0.026*** 0.002 -0.004 -0.000
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.000)
Parties uncoordinated at municipality and state level -0.050** 0.069* 0.159** 0.096* 0.064 0.000
(0.025) (0.039) (0.068) (0.056) (0.043) (0.000)
Mixed type municipality (urban/rural) -0.060*** -0.061 -0.105** 0.001 -0.004 -0.000
(0.017) (0.056) (0.044) (0.044) (0.026) (0.000)
Mixed type*Uncoordinated 0.035 0.187* 0.107 0.083 0.001
(0.062) (0.107) (0.081) (0.068) (0.002)
Rural*Distance to north border -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Population 2005 0.045 -0.017 -0.097 0.328** 0.409*** 0.002
(0.095) (0.177) (0.148) (0.167) (0.151) (0.006)
Squared log population -0.000 0.015 0.009 -0.012 -0.016** -0.000
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.000)
Log GDP per capita 2005 0.022 0.175** 0.155** 0.117* -0.001 0.000
(0.038) (0.078) (0.071) (0.065) (0.035) (0.000)
%Children school attendance 2005 -0.001 -0.007** -0.009*** -0.005** -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Remmittances 0.002 0.011*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.011** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000)
Squared remmitances -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Municipality ruled by PAN only -0.003 -0.114** -0.036 -0.062** -0.042* -0.000
(0.022) (0.050) (0.043) (0.030) (0.023) (0.000)
Municipality ruled by PRI only -0.028 -0.010 0.033 -0.046 -0.013 -0.000
(0.022) (0.048) (0.050) (0.034) (0.020) (0.000)
Total homicide rate 2004 0.000 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Squared Homicide rate 2004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Uncoordinated*Homicide rate 2004 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Uncoordinated*Minimum distance to border -0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.51 0.65
Available treated 74 811 202 203 203 203
Available controls 581 581 581 581 581 581
Total municipalities considered in probit 655 1392 783 784 784 784
Treated remaining in region of common support 68 690 179 149 135 150
Controls remaining in region of common support 403 553 534 477 403 137
Total matched municipalities in region in common support 471 1243 713 626 538 287




Marginal effects of experiencing drug trafficking or drug-related homicides using probit regression 
shown in Eq.(1). (*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, z and P>|z| 
correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Index of marginalization 2000 38.31 39.01 0.64 36.19 36.85 0.56 35.94 36.04 0.94 36.96 36.68 0.84 37.97 38.38 0.78 37.67 39.00 0.42
Capability poverty 2000 47.92 50.44 0.46 45.10 45.22 0.95 41.35 39.38 0.50 46.27 44.79 0.57 48.62 48.56 0.98 51.70 54.12 0.32
Food poverty 2000 40.93 43.41 0.46 37.87 38.17 0.88 34.85 33.03 0.51 39.03 37.84 0.63 41.10 41.07 0.99 43.83 46.16 0.35
Political parties uncoordinated 0.37 0.36 0.90 0.47 0.50 0.58 0.51 0.50 0.85 0.45 0.45 0.98 0.46 0.43 0.65 0.45 0.53 0.34
Mixed type municipality (urban/rural) 0.26 0.26 0.94 0.33 0.32 0.84 0.28 0.26 0.62 0.35 0.40 0.44 0.33 0.30 0.71 0.29 0.24 0.48
Mixed type*Uncoordinated 0.06 0.04 0.65 383.10 381.88 0.97 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.66 0.13 0.10 0.51 0.11 0.13 0.79
Rural*Distance to north border 380.20 398.24 0.74 365.52 378.67 0.77 419.07 363.33 0.25 429.24 421.67 0.89 377.62 424.06 0.47
Log Population 2005 9.23 9.28 0.72 9.69 9.62 0.48 8.93 8.74 0.20 9.47 9.44 0.79 9.76 9.83 0.51 10.46 10.48 0.85
Squared log population 86.36 87.43 0.72 95.04 93.65 0.48 81.18 77.75 0.18 90.42 89.97 0.81 95.77 97.22 0.49 109.78 110.03 0.90
Log GDP per capita 2005 10.80 10.78 0.69 10.84 10.85 0.71 10.89 10.89 0.92 10.81 10.86 0.31 10.78 10.78 0.91 10.76 10.72 0.42
Children school attendance 2005 64.17 63.92 0.72 63.60 63.21 0.45 63.04 63.14 0.91 63.48 63.49 0.98 64.61 63.76 0.24 63.48 62.75 0.37
Remmitances 7.89 7.47 0.76 8.47 8.49 0.98 10.64 11.02 0.74 9.14 8.54 0.58 6.87 6.97 0.91 5.87 5.28 0.55
Squared remmittances 151.04 141.78 0.84 199.02 200.13 0.97 154.71 138.56 0.57 100.19 98.70 0.95 93.29 65.41 0.25
Municipality ruled by PAN only 0.37 0.38 0.84 0.26 0.28 0.78 0.23 0.23 0.93 0.26 0.29 0.59 0.22 0.26 0.56 0.35 0.39 0.62
Municipality ruled by PRI only 0.43 0.42 0.88 0.49 0.52 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.88 0.49 0.46 0.67 0.48 0.51 0.65 0.47 0.47 1.00
Homicide rate 2004 3.82 3.74 0.93 15.79 15.00 0.81 9.57 9.39 0.90 9.26 8.19 0.44 6.53 6.85 0.76
Squared homicide rate 2004 868.43 877.73 0.98 263.51 246.41 0.80 248.55 198.64 0.49 82.16 85.72 0.88
Homicide rate 2004*uncoordinated 2.63 2.60 0.98 9.31 9.25 0.99 4.05 4.00 0.96 4.64 3.55 0.35 2.82 3.47 0.49
Uncoordinated*Main entrance to border 83.55 78.54 0.70 67.62 70.46 0.83 64.97 64.56 0.98 69.63 91.28 0.29
1st Quartile
Panel A:                              
Cartels without drug-related 
homicides                
All that experienced at least one drug-
related homicide 4th Quartile 3rd Quartile 2nd Quartile
Panel B: Drug-related homicides
 
Sources: Parties uncoordinated at municipality and state level own estimates using official electoral results. Data on distances own estimates using geo-




Descriptive statistics of welfare statistics across matched areas that fall in the region of common support  
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Food poverty % 32.12 35.32 30.02 30.14 -3.1 29.55 29.50 27.05 26.74 -0.3 29.40 26.08 23.73 24.54 4.1**
(16.56) (19.53) (18.22) (19.51) (2.8) (15.03) (16.30) (16.69) (16.17) (1.0) (15.66) (15.85) (16.85) (16.70) (2.0)
Capability poverty % 40.45 43.37 39.03 38.85 -3.1 37.72 37.53 35.81 35.41 -0.2 37.28 33.53 31.86 32.66 4.5**
(17.60) (20.26) (20.01) (21.07) (3.0) (16.14) (17.22) (18.52) (17.83) (1.1) (16.97) (16.99) (19.30) (18.61) (2.3)
Patrimony poverty % 62.31 64.05 63.05 62.48 -2.3 59.84 59.47 60.11 59.68 -0.1 58.76 55.16 55.65 56.36 4.3*
(16.98) (18.10) (20.06) (19.82) (2.7) (15.99) (16.52) (19.32) (17.94) (1.2) (16.73) (16.79) (21.21) (19.05) (2.4)
Gini 42.32 43.22 41.76 41.18 -1.5** 42.88 43.35 41.03 42.07 0.6 42.52 43.42 40.58 41.78 0.3
(3.901) (3.830) (3.917) (4.424) (0.6) (3.658) (4.206) (3.884) (4.010) (0.4) (4.002) (4.463) (3.696) (4.027) (0.6)
Total population 17840.2 17225.2 18752.6 17344.5 -793.1 23027.7 25292.7 24578.9 27648.8 805.0 11368.1 14503.2 12002.1 15313.0 175.8
(17032.7) (17228.0) (18599.5) (17227.0) (556.7) (19719.4) (23535.4) (21908.2) (26980.8) (567.9) (13406.1) (18749.5) (14758.0) (20271.7) (379.3)
Number of people that resided in another state with more homicides 5 
years ago per 10,000 inhabitants 72.84 70.30 78.25 78.06 2.3 65.52 57.21 74.92 56.72 -9.9*** 52.47 46.95 70.87 35.69 -29.7***
(35.08) (34.71) (31.60) (33.92) (5.5) (34.50) (39.13) (30.78) (37.63) (3.2) (41.01) (41.18) (36.32) (37.93) (6.4)
Total number of migrants that moved into 2000 vs 2010a 218.2 327.6 276.6 290.6 -92.2 277.5 430.7 319.4 585.4 110.9* 153.9 233.7 167.8 244.3 -4.9
(268.2) (502.3) (386.6) (429.6) (71.5) (270.5) (655.9) (349.8) (1632.2) (61.7) (196.8) (402.6) (225.4) (359.9) (19.9)
Number of people that moved in and had less earning income than non-
migrant population 2000 vs 2010a 205.7 311.8 255.7 265.2 -93.8 260.6 403.1 291.0 530.8 95.7* 143.7 216.1 152.5 219.9 -6.6
(255.9) (485.5) (372.0) (390.2) (68.9) (257.5) (625.5) (326.9) (1474.6) (56.0) (186.7) (375.7) (209.6) (327.4) (18.9)
Number of people that moved in and had more earning income than 
non-migrant population 2000 vs 2010a 18.46 21.28 22.67 30.35 5.0 22.24 32.98 31.10 56.86 18.9** 14.14 21.82 18.44 25.93 -1.1
(19.65) (24.38) (27.85) (45.40) (6.7) (20.00) (42.29) (32.44) (167.4) (8.3) (16.02) (34.57) (23.04) (39.43) (3.6)
Unemployment rate 2000 vs 2010 0.802 0.837 4.399 4.127 -0.3 0.904 1.059 4.726 4.682 -0.2 0.860 1.032 4.406 5.175 0.6
(0.541) (0.598) (3.472) (3.098) (0.4) (0.521) (0.759) (3.294) (2.942) (0.3) (0.583) (0.773) (3.303) (3.986) (0.4)
Unemployment rate low educated 2000 vs 2010a 0.944 1.007 4.792 5.073 0.2 1.084 1.174 5.023 5.278 0.2 0.975 1.197 4.728 6.082 1.1**
(1.139) (0.878) (3.984) (3.927) (0.5) (1.209) (1.376) (3.630) (3.993) (0.3) (0.965) (1.326) (3.896) (5.034) (0.5)
Unemployment rate high school plus 2000 vs 2010a 0.983 0.819 3.371 3.583 0.4 0.855 0.823 3.294 3.779 0.5 0.742 0.436 3.091 4.116 1.3***
(1.880) (1.098) (2.749) (2.710) (0.4) (1.383) (2.991) (2.496) (2.784) (0.3) (1.275) (0.841) (2.904) (3.599) (0.4)
Number of municipalities 403 68 553 690 534 179
DID              
(no controls)
DID              
(no controls)
2005 2010
Panel A: Cartels no drug-related homicides At least one drug-related homicide 4th  Quartile
Panel B: Drug-related homicides
2005 2010 2005 2010









Table A.3 (continuation) 
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Food poverty % 29.36 30.25 26.49 25.85 -0.977 32.52 33.01 29.54 28.15 -1.458 33.96 31.44 31.91 31.82 2.539
(13.91) (15.86) (15.65) (15.64) (0.441) (14.94) (16.79) (16.10) (15.84) (0.331) (13.50) (16.19) (14.33) (16.70) (0.195)
Capability poverty % 37.61 38.29 35.35 34.48 -0.953 41.12 41.07 38.71 37.02 -1.172 43.18 40.02 41.71 41.25 2.745
(15.04) (16.86) (17.51) (17.39) (0.494) (15.77) (18.01) (17.66) (17.61) (0.465) (13.69) (16.69) (14.97) (17.69) (0.176)
Patrimony poverty % 59.99 60.06 60.07 58.88 -0.660 63.48 61.90 63.25 61.16 -0.0863 66.49 62.82 67.02 65.87 2.393
(14.85) (16.36) (18.26) (17.82) (0.660) (14.88) (18.17) (17.78) (18.22) (0.958) (11.85) (14.82) (13.14) (16.02) (0.198)
Gini 42.90 43.04 41.37 41.67 0.128 43.06 43.61 41.92 42.39 0.165 43.04 43.48 42.38 42.61 -0.0878
(3.778) (3.918) (3.821) (3.806) (0.805) (3.599) (4.094) (3.781) (4.185) (0.762) (3.389) (3.773) (4.223) (3.972) (0.893)
Total population 18487.8 18370.7 19359.9 19604.4 -8.888 23847.9 23956.5 25507.0 26526.9 340.9 41992.5 47962.0 44941.2 54037.8 4,124**
(16505.8) (15856.4) (18064.8) (17064.6) (0.985) (17710.7) (24317.7) (19469.1) (27930.9) (0.620) (19697.9) (60999.8) (21766.0) (67682.8) (0.0410)
Number of people that resided in 
another state with more homicides 5 
years ago per 10,000 inhabitants 61.87 55.01 73.06 54.12 -12.68*** 63.83 60.45 75.29 62.94 -4.153 70.02 69.01 77.42 76.00 -0.0968
(36.57) (40.61) (34.00) (35.71) (0.00913) (35.88) (38.62) (30.90) (35.52) (0.389) (28.77) (33.81) (23.98) (30.76) (0.980)
Total number of migrants that moved 
into 2000 vs 2010a 232.2 330.5 267.9 392.2 24.27 307.5 371.5 344.4 613.7 64.80 453.7 828.0 593.3 1353.2 487.8*
(242.8) (501.4) (320.1) (599.0) (0.564) (300.1) (417.9) (323.2) (1349.4) (0.182) (319.5) (2234.0) (438.9) (3821.5) (0.0699)
Number of people that moved in and 
had less earning income than non-
migrant population 2000 vs 2010a 217.2 306.5 246.3 353.1 22.96 288.3 346.9 314.5 559.9 47.46 425.2 775.5 541.3 1221.1 421.9*
(231.2) (471.1) (303.6) (544.4) (0.562) (287.7) (391.4) (300.6) (1267.7) (0.281) (303.3) (2074.5) (410.6) (3422.6) (0.0788)
Number of people that moved in and 
had more earning income than non-
migrant population 2000 vs 2010a 19.64 29.27 24.53 41.20 1.841 24.39 31.41 32.49 54.61 15.60* 35.54 58.95 53.13 138.0 77.47**
(18.93) (41.74) (26.38) (65.68) (0.749) (21.00) (35.32) (33.17) (100.3) (0.0900) (24.84) (170.9) (42.88) (412.4) (0.0324)
Unemployment rate 2000 vs 2010 0.877 1.109 4.426 4.757 -0.0291 0.937 1.045 4.802 4.464 -0.421 0.935 1.099 5.005 4.454 -0.633
(0.543) (0.708) (3.072) (2.854) (0.936) (0.621) (0.756) (3.438) (2.499) (0.250) (0.468) (0.907) (3.050) (2.255) (0.132)
Unemployment rate low educated 2000 
vs 2010a 1.037 1.286 4.841 5.760 0.721 1.061 1.210 4.705 4.898 -0.0851 0.952 1.054 5.059 4.550 -0.429
(0.963) (1.425) (3.638) (4.585) (0.182) (1.065) (1.934) (3.385) (3.259) (0.845) (0.862) (1.004) (3.047) (2.694) (0.373)
Unemployment rate high school plus 
2000 vs 2010a 0.955 0.708 3.164 3.634 0.812** 0.920 0.975 3.283 3.884 0.410 0.885 1.241 3.407 3.649 -0.105
(1.479) (1.168) (2.421) (2.684) (0.0193) (1.502) (1.563) (2.191) (2.664) (0.249) (1.184) (5.750) (1.803) (2.125) (0.861)
Number of municipalities 477 149 403 135 137 150
DID              
(no controls)





DID              
(no controls)
3rd Quartile
Panel B: Drug-related homicides
 
 
DID stands for difference-in-difference kernel matching, which is estimated by comparing each treated group to its respective matched control group using 
the Eq.(2). Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Sources: a Own estimates using the micro-data population sample from 
census records, provided by INEGI and Minnesota Population Center (2014). All other statistics INEGI.
 42
 
Fig. A.4 Trends in homicides rates between treatment and controls after kernel matching 
 
 



















Probit marginal effects: Propensity scores used to match areas and evaluate impact on industries 
Cartels but no 
drug-related 
homicides
At least one 
drug-related 
homicide 4th Quartile 3rd Quartile 2nd Quartile 1st Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index of marginalization 2000 0.000 -0.003** 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capability poverty 2000 -0.001 -0.002** -0.008* -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Food poverty 2000 0.000 0.008* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Parties uncoordinated at municipality and state level -0.004 0.117*** 0.073*** 0.006 -0.002 0.000
(0.011) (0.029) (0.023) (0.009) (0.002) (0.000)
Mixed type municipality (urban/rural) -0.011 -0.046** 0.004 -0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.002) (0.000)
Mixed type*Uncoordinated 0.012 0.045 0.000* 0.002 -0.000
(0.024) (0.051) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Rural*Distance to north border -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Population 2005 -0.043 0.211*** 0.240** 0.010 0.040 0.000***
(0.038) (0.013) (0.098) (0.010) (0.028) (0.000)
Squared log population 0.003 -0.012** 0.000* -0.002 -0.000***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Log GDP per capita 2005 0.020 0.350*** 0.103*** 0.139 0.007 0.000
(0.015) (0.065) (0.036) (0.207) (0.007) (0.000)
%Children school attendance 2005 0.000 -0.002 -0.004*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Remmittances 0.002 0.006*** 0.005** 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Squared remmitances -0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Municipality ruled by PAN only 0.005 -0.078*** 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.010) (0.030) (0.022) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
Municipality ruled by PRI only -0.003 0.024 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.023) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
Total homicide rate 2004 0.000* 0.003*** 0.001 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Squared homicide rate 2004 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Homicide rate 2004*Uncoordinated -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minimum distance to border -0.000 -19.275* -0.000 -0.100 -0.000
(0.000) (11.512) (0.000) (0.674) (0.000)
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.34 0.22 0.33 0.47 0.74
Available treated 46 485 121 121 121 122
Available controls 929 933 933 933 933 933
Total municipalities considered in probit 975 1418 1054 1054 1054 1055
Treated remaining in region of common support 40 403 115 107 109 82
Controls remaining in region of common support 458 878 795 835 396 111
Total matched municipalities in region in common support 498 1281 910 942 505 193
Drug-related homicides by sub-groups
 
 
Marginal effects of experiencing drug trafficking or drug-related homicides using probit regression 
shown in Eq.(1). (*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1, z and P>|z| 
correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0. Standard errors in parentheses *** 




Fig. A.7 Distribution of propensity scores between treatment and control groups  
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Table A.5 































Index of marginalization 2000 33.98 34.7 0.735 35.8 35.94 0.916 35.39 35.85 0.694 32.66 32.41 0.879 34.04 32.87 0.638
Capability poverty 2000 43.44 43.22 0.952 44.49 43.84 0.684 41.94 41.99 0.986 44.47 45.25 0.723 42.53 42.56 0.992 46.46 44.47 0.615
Food poverty 2000 36.09 35.95 0.969 35.54 35.63 0.971 37.26 38.08 0.7 34.81 34.97 0.951 38.48 36.5 0.604
Uncoordinated 0.4 0.3 0.243 0.49 0.52 0.516 0.63 0.6 0.574 0.48 0.48 0.915 0.37 0.35 0.795 0.5 0.51 0.95
Mixed type municipality (urban/rural) 0.23 0.26 0.609 0.23 0.23 0.875 0.41 0.41 0.99 0.29 0.32 0.714 0.29 0.24 0.587
Mixed type*Uncoordinated 0.07 0.09 0.816 0.12 0.11 0.711 0.12 0.15 0.652 0.13 0.13 0.938
Rural*Distance to north border 361.17 348.78 0.864 358.26 359.79 0.961 407 416.78 0.826 364.73 366.65 0.969 304.94 301.61 0.95 302.61 290.64 0.872
Log Population 2005 10.01 9.91 0.575 9.86 9.79 0.423 8.97 8.87 0.368 9.79 9.78 0.975 10.35 10.28 0.47 10.88 10.86 0.829
Squared log population 101.19 99.26 0.588 81.54 79.73 0.386 118.23 117.88 0.654 107.67 106.09 0.429 118.69 118.16 0.789
Log GDP per capita 2005 10.91 10.89 0.831 10.87 10.88 0.732 10.89 10.89 0.898 10.87 10.85 0.637 10.94 10.93 0.803 10.87 10.88 0.908
Children school attendance 2005 64.37 64.11 0.764 63.67 63.53 0.739 62.76 62.8 0.945 64.54 64.29 0.625 64.06 64.17 0.871 63.91 64.24 0.773
Remmittances 7.73 7.65 0.955 8.37 8.32 0.94 9.79 9.98 0.851 8.76 8.95 0.85 8.49 7.93 0.591 5.15 4.87 0.792
Squared remmitances 116.93 117.96 0.973 176.83 180.9 0.893 125.43 115.54 0.69 64.85 50.27 0.462
Municipality ruled by PAN only 0.35 0.35 0.979 0.27 0.24 0.455 0.26 0.25 0.774 0.24 0.23 0.729 0.25 0.2 0.363 0.32 0.32 0.97
Municipality ruled by PRI only 0.4 0.44 0.679 0.49 0.47 0.705 0.49 0.48 0.903 0.5 0.5 0.982 0.45 0.45 0.956
Minimum distance to border 0 0 0.536 0 0 0.65 0.15815 0.15776 0.000974 0 0 0.364 0 0 0.654
Homicide rate 2004 6.18 5.88 0.81 15.89 15.86 0.991 9.78 8.91 0.465 10.06 9.53 0.73 6.25 5.7 0.661
Squared homicide rate 2004 85.11 82.47 0.925 415.96 374.86 0.734 938.45 890.3 0.893 208.43 172.16 0.381 231.66 200.85 0.69 69.17 61.1 0.726
Homicide rate 2004*uncoordinated 1.54 1.1 0.368 5.81 5.07 0.442 9.98 9.92 0.982 4.24 3.8 0.622 4.36 3.44 0.411 3.29 3.36 0.953
Panel A: Cartels without drug-
related homicides                
Panel B: Drug-related homicides
All that experienced at least one-




Descriptive statistics of industries across matched areas that fall in the region of common support  
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
production thousand USD 36060.8 73859.6 77460.2 115538.2 279.2 33845.3 69196.8 62825.7 76868.2 -21,309.1 18277.6 7286.1 39533.3 5548.9 -22,993.0**
(110103.7)(323470.7) (250822.0) -501193 (37,931.5) (131290.5)(468507.9)(232892.9)(445651.1) (13,801.7) (104165.7) (25238.7) (193417.5) (17758.9) (11,283.6)
profit thousand USD 11968.5 10032.5 26186.3 17671.1 -6,579.2 10753.7 19639.9 20923.8 20697.8 -9,112.3* 5215.8 3339.4 10067.5 2385.5 -5,805.6**
(34396.8) (26939.9) (85171.5) -62000.1 (10,753.9) (40227.0) (117908.2) (76861.7) (95270.6) (4,919.1) (29771.9) (11846.0) (58149.0) (7977.2) (2,735.9)
workers  per 10,000 
inhabitants 235.7 161.5 290.6 168.5 -47.9 219.0 208.2 270.1 221.4 -37.8** 170.4 224.1 217.0 195.5 -75.2**
(332.5) (239.1) (388.8) -206 (35.2) (325.5) (368.4) (355.1) (319.3) (16.3) (291.3) (491.3) (366.5) (272.9) (36.5)
salaries per worker thousand 
USD 3.971 4.364 4.273 4.144 -0.5** 4.026 4.152 4.246 3.940 -0.4** 3.278 3.296 3.537 2.903 -0.7*
(2.705) (4.270) (3.441) -4.469 (0.2) (3.132) (3.542) (4.099) (3.310) (0.2) (3.103) (3.008) (4.174) (2.144) (0.3)
establisments per 10,000 
inhabitants 31.03 24.24 42.29 34.47 -1.0 33.03 32.40 46.05 44.23 -1.2 30.48 35.18 47.37 43.04 -9.0***
(33.31) (19.99) (46.45) -34.73 (3.2) (64.15) (55.83) (92.24) (62.41) (1.8) (89.06) (90.62) (136.1) (86.46) (3.3)
production thousand USD 4298.3 4178.7 3749.2 5114.4 1,484.9 2848.7 4582.6 2891.8 4663.9 38.3 955.1 2328.3 1075.4 2441.4 -7.2
(6618.5) (6433.6) (5453.7) -8747.5 (1,163.2) (4907.3) (10957.6) (5492.9) (13237.8) (435.1) (2648.6) (7670.4) (3401.9) (9558.0) (297.9)
profit thousand USD 2634.3 2681.8 2447.6 3271.7 776.6 1923.8 2757.6 1960.3 2884.7 90.5 642.4 1470.2 747.0 1679.7 104.8
(4044.9) (4051.1) (4014.7) -5297.8 (744.6) (3424.2) (6168.9) (4477.8) (7505.8) (374.1) (1822.2) (4534.3) (2806.6) (6897.1) (314.7)
workers  per 10,000 
inhabitants 39.28 43.33 43.09 47.58 0.4 33.82 40.26 37.28 40.32 -3.4 22.27 26.66 24.60 30.75 1.8
(33.67) (36.98) (38.79) -53.53 (6.7) (29.87) (50.02) (39.07) (50.89) (2.5) (26.52) (36.13) (32.04) (47.08) (3.2)
salaries per worker thousand 
USD 4.821 5.386 4.800 5.381 0.0 4.639 4.721 4.595 4.726 0.1 3.337 3.304 2.947 3.589 0.7
(3.080) (3.100) (3.147) -3.351 (0.5) (3.546) (3.318) (3.407) (3.779) (0.3) (3.944) (3.294) (3.183) (4.943) (0.6)
establisments per 10,000 
inhabitants 6.900 7.484 7.079 7.855 0.2 6.545 6.845 6.766 6.831 -0.2 5.281 5.833 5.858 5.863 -0.5
(4.443) (5.377) (4.920) -5.915 (0.8) (4.619) (5.329) (5.026) (5.339) (0.3) (5.097) (5.846) (5.848) (6.021) (0.6)
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Table A.6 (continuation) 
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
production thousand USD 28391.5 55095.7 51823.9 78988.0 459.9 54055.7 149207.1 104300.6 172860.5 -26,591.6 65765.1 219953.3 152108.6 324591.6 18,294.7
(126152.6) (387467.6)(209724.3)(575492.5) (19,770.0) (159995.9) (586758.3) (304135.1) (629013.5) (32,834.5) (146610.7) (856091.1) (344874.9) (1270168.6) (73,496.2)
profit thousand USD 9254.6 15622.4 16914.0 14597.7 -8,684.0** 18172.8 40345.2 35303.9 53920.2 -3,556.0 22076.6 75510.7 52502.5 111346.1 5,409.6
(41064.6) (96476.1) (68255.8) (80300.9) (3,393.8) (52485.1) (143698.1) (101911.6) (198850.1) (11,261.0) (48852.8) (271972.8) (118000.7) (404886.3) (25,466.3)
workers  per 10,000 
inhabitants 197.7 185.2 248.6 205.6 -30.5** 280.1 238.2 327.6 273.0 -12.6 279.3 321.5 371.5 367.4 -46.2
(295.7) (263.7) (319.9) (244.8) (15.1) (361.8) (324.3) (393.8) (365.1) (22.4) (352.2) (542.9) (462.6) (659.0) (44.5)
salaries per worker thousand 
USD 3.838 3.983 3.992 3.818 -0.3 4.500 4.714 5.014 4.638 -0.6* 4.484 5.336 5.141 5.479 -0.5
(2.887) (3.879) (3.742) (3.906) (0.2) (2.736) (3.335) (3.855) (3.362) (0.3) (2.031) (3.574) (2.973) (3.981) (0.4)
establisments per 10,000 
inhabitants 35.17 33.78 49.98 50.87 2.3 32.25 32.73 41.78 43.67 1.4 30.07 29.84 39.97 42.63 2.9
(68.57) (39.82) (98.76) (60.29) (3.3) (26.75) (30.88) (37.86) (48.37) (2.5) (22.82) (29.31) (32.88) (39.72) (3.3)
production thousand USD 2664.8 2883.0 3512.6 3459.2 -271.6 5234.1 12272.7 4611.3 14284.5 2,634.6 8932.9 18714.8 7345.6 18385.4 1,257.9
(4524.3) (7112.6) (7463.2) (10831.3) (885.2) (7069.8) (31247.6) (6414.5) (44187.6) (1,993.6) (7983.5) (97407.7) (5856.5) (86598.3) (1,814.8)
profit thousand USD 1819.6 1818.9 2630.5 1976.8 -653.1 3438.4 7330.2 2996.6 9414.6 2,526.1* 5692.5 12408.1 4557.7 10915.4 -357.9
(3258.4) (4259.9) (6635.4) (5060.2) (733.2) (4834.9) (20053.8) (5050.6) (29489.8) (1,494.4) (5201.4) (67341.5) (3854.4) (52612.8) (1,872.6)
workers  per 10,000 
inhabitants 36.07 37.71 37.53 40.02 0.8 44.64 57.80 48.92 56.39 -5.7 48.68 50.75 53.72 49.20 -6.6
(30.33) (55.46) (37.02) (51.04) (3.2) (32.42) (61.16) (41.23) (65.59) (4.6) (29.50) (40.34) (36.11) (41.32) (5.3)
salaries per worker thousand 
USD 4.728 4.987 4.570 4.683 -0.1 5.486 5.625 5.567 5.531 -0.2 6.249 5.844 5.638 6.144 0.9
(3.332) (3.264) (3.198) (2.766) (0.4) (2.799) (3.233) (3.056) (3.355) (0.3) (2.720) (2.748) (2.341) (3.452) (0.6)
establisments per 10,000 
inhabitants 6.965 6.964 7.090 7.418 0.3 7.490 7.985 7.563 7.536 -0.5 7.459 7.158 7.333 7.374 0.3
(4.711) (6.252) (5.207) (5.892) (0.7) (4.022) (4.905) (4.371) (4.862) (0.5) (3.634) (3.667) (3.784) (4.129) (0.7)























DID           
(no controls)
Panel B: Drug-related homicides
3rd Quartile 2nd Quartile 1st Quartile
 
 
DID stands for difference-in-difference kernel matching, which is estimated by comparing each treated group to its respective matched control group using 
the Eq.(2). Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Source: INEGI, economic census. 
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Table A.7 
Placebo test on welfare indicators using 1990-2000 as pre-treatment and 2001-2005 as post-treatment 













Difference-in-difference 3.955 3.881 3.070 0.00429 -179.2 -38.62
(0.162) (0.178) (0.238) (0.601) (0.553) (0.326)
Observations 905 905 905 905 905 905
Panel B: Placebo treatment assuming cartels moved into area experiencing drug-related homicides in 2001 instead of 2006
All areas that are assumed to have experienced at least one drug-related homicide 
Difference-in-difference 0.926 0.581 -0.211 -0.00357 123.6 -2.499
(0.530) (0.708) (0.892) (0.513) (0.709) (0.938)
Observations 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357 2,357
Fourth quartile (with most drug-related homicides)
Difference-in-difference 0.879 0.718 0.405 0.0136 -289.8 9.967
(0.578) (0.663) (0.803) (0.107) (0.541) (0.744)
Observations 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204
Third quartile 
Difference-in-difference -0.410 -0.568 -0.831 -0.00576 -351.5 19.66
(0.792) (0.728) (0.609) (0.409) (0.268) (0.421)
Observations 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312
Second quartile 
Difference-in-difference 1.159 0.751 -0.685 0.00789 88.63 41.25
(0.542) (0.707) (0.732) (0.277) (0.838) (0.231)
Observations 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156 1,156
First quartile 
Difference-in-difference 2.532 2.055 0.816 -0.00420 -52.88 -21.95
(0.254) (0.375) (0.714) (0.552) (0.928) (0.593)
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510
Panel A: Placebo treatment assuming cartels moved into area without experiencing drug-related homicides in 2001 instead of 2006
 
The difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator compares each placebo treated group to its respective matched control group using the panel fixed 
regression shown in Eq.(4). Controls used in all specifications: Poverty-relief subsidies per capita and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at municipality level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 Source: economic census and controls used INEGI. 
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Table A.8 
Placebo test on manufacture and wholesale trade using 1990-2000 as pre-treatment and 2001-2005 as post-treatment 































Difference-in-difference -40,851.694 -21,945.778 -23.391 -0.660 0.848 952.732 809.351 -2.543 0.204 0.089
(27,502.002) (17,561.034) (31.028) (0.637) (5.572) (718.142) (681.971) (3.595) (0.334) (0.545)
Observations 869 869 869 868 869 680 680 680 680 680
Panel B: Placebo treatment assuming cartels moved into area experiencing drug-related homicides in 2001 instead of 2006
All areas that are assumed to have experienced at least one drug-related homicide 
Difference-in-difference -28,903.811 -22,146.064 -25.141 -0.730 0.021 23.186 -134.522 -0.889 -0.115 -0.820*
(28,892.661) (18,447.494) (25.246) (0.633) (3.193) (382.194) (276.202) (3.419) (0.314) (0.491)
Observations 2,279 2,279 2,279 2,278 2,279 1,839 1,839 1,839 1,839 1,839
Fourth quartile (with most drug-related homicides)
Difference-in-difference -38,410.084 -18,713.283 -38.430 -0.748 2.028 -400.818 -357.706 -2.136 -0.075 -0.501
(24,888.372) (15,560.391) (31.181) (0.584) (7.738) (364.369) (250.906) (4.999) (0.341) (0.702)
Observations 1,139 1,139 1,139 1,138 1,139 776 776 776 776 776
Third quartile 
Difference-in-difference -20,867.581 -11,916.734 8.117 -0.085 5.671 -440.678 -34.902 -7.248 0.484 -0.947
(16,423.030) (10,557.327) (23.886) (0.442) (4.525) (534.634) (363.365) (6.399) (0.487) (0.774)
Observations 1,246 1,246 1,246 1,245 1,246 902 902 902 902 902
Second quartile 
Difference-in-difference -28,310.031 -17,382.017 -32.611 -0.857 -2.151 729.053 389.344 0.432 0.220 -1.033
(23,218.878) (14,995.864) (21.147) (0.562) (2.588) (691.555) (516.252) (4.774) (0.545) (0.713)
Observations 1,116 1,116 1,116 1,115 1,116 862 862 862 862 862
First quartile 
Difference-in-difference -1,269.478 -17,933.842 -4.126 -0.626 1.901 183.664 62.928 2.904 0.469 -0.631
(34,846.455) (16,124.433) (26.943) (0.582) (5.439) (902.239) (705.204) (6.420) (0.751) (0.552)
Observations 507 507 507 507 507 484 484 484 484 484
Manufactures Wholesale Trade
Panel A: Placebo treatment assuming cartels moved into area without experiencing drug-related homicides in 2001 instead of 2006
 
The difference-in-difference kernel matching estimator compares each placebo treated group to its respective matched control group using the panel fixed 
regression shown in Eq.(4). Controls used in all specifications: Poverty-relief subsidies per capita and state’s unemployment rate, all lagged for two years.  














Appendix B: Using Google to Identify Cartels’ presence 
We use the official records to identify which municipalities suffered drug-related homicides 
stemming from battles among cartels and with the state authority (SNSP, 2011). These 
official records, available from December 2006 until September 2011, have been used in 
previous studies to analyze the impact of drug-related violence (BenYishay and Pearlman, 
2013; Robles et al., 2013; Calderón et al., 2015; Dell, 2015; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2016). In 
parallel to this official information, we also identify the municipalities where cartels operate 
with and without drug-related homicides using the Google search engine. Below we describe 
the six steps followed in this search. 
 
1. First, we selected Google search Mexico, https://www.google.com.mx, as our exploratory 
analysis suggested more hits were found in this way rather than using the default Google 
search engine of other countries. Nonetheless, we kept our search wide open. That is we did 
not limit the search to a specific source, country or language. The exact list of sources where 
we found reports of municipalities being affected by drug cartels or drug-related homicides is 
listed in Table B.1. 
 
2. In the ‘Tools of Search,’ we selected the corresponding period to search. As we analyze the 
impact of cartels for various periods, we split our search into different periods 1990-2000, 
2001-2005, 2006-2008 and 2006-2010. For instance, if searching for 2000-2005, we selected 




Sources used to identify Mexican municipalities affected by drug cartels and drug-related homicides  
Mexican government sources TV clips and other videos Blogs International sources
Agencia de Servicios Informativos de Chiapas Informador Informe de gobierno TU TV México Bloggeando desde Zacatecas El diario (Spain)
Alcolor Político La crónica Procuraduría General de la Republica (PGR) Grupo Reforma online videos Cannabis café forum El nuevo herald (USA)
Álvaro Sánchez Noticias La Insignia Procuraduría Agraria (PA) Mashpedia videos Defensa México El Transnational Institute (Netherlands)
Centro de estudios para la transición 
democrática La jornada
Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional 
(SEDENA) Noticias y más vlog El blog del narco Foreign Military Studies Office (USA)
Centro de Periodistas de Investigación La jornada de oriente Noticiero e-consulta videos En guerra contra el narco Hechos de hoy  (Spain)
Chiapas contralinea La jornada Morelos Puebla online TV videos En medio Univisión noticias (USA)
Chompipe periódico La policiaca TV Maya Narco news 
Carlos Resa Nestares (Spain). Data on 
erradicated illegal drug crop at Mexican 
municipality level, based on Mexican official 
data
CNN México La política mx Narcotráfico en México 
Contralínea Las noticias México Noticias del narco 
Contralínea Michoacán Letras libres Observatorio ciudadano 
Contralínea Sonora Linderonote Puro narco 
Crónica Oaxaca México denuncia The narco news bulletin
Diario cambio México informado Tu aregnoticias 
Diario critica Milenio
Diario de colima Mural
Dossier político Nexos
Drogas México Org Noticias Nayarit
El economista Noticias y actualidad
El imparcial NTR Zacatecas
El imperial Nvinoticias.com
El matutino virtual Off News info.
El nauzonteco de Puebla Orizaba en red
El norte Orizaba en red
El nuevo diario Periódico el Sur
El occidental Periodistas en Línea
El orbe Poblanerias
El país Puebla online
El porvenir Punto por punto
El regional Radio motul
El siglo de Durango Reforma
El siglo de Torreón Revista proceso
El suracapulco Reynosa libre
El universal Seminario Nuestro Tiempo
El zenzontle Sipse
Es más noticias (Televisa) Status Puebla
Estrella roja Tabasco Hoy
Excélsior Terra noticias
Expansión The Narco News Bulletin Chiapas
Fronteriza Chiapas Una Fuente
IB times México Vanguardia




Mexican newspapers and magazines 
 
3. Then, for each of the 2,456 municipalities in the country we searched for incidences of 
drug-related homicide as a direct result of inter- or intra- cartels battles or with the authority. 
To this end, we searched the combination of name of the municipality and the word narco, a 
commonly used word to refer to drug cartels - narco homicidios, narco violencia, asesinatos, 
drug-related homicides, narco fighting, narco-fosas (where cartels dump bodies).  
If this initial search proved successful, meaning Google suggested some hints, we 
proceeded to read the links provided. We made sure that the report suggested that the 
homicides were derived from battles amongst cartels and the state. Drug-related homicides 
tend to be extremely gruesome. Mutilations, people found dissolving in tanks full of acid or 
hanging from public bridges with messages. These are the tell-tell signs that lead journalists 
or authorities to suggest the assassinations or bodies found were derived from the cartels’ 
conflicts and not from other types of opportunistic crime that went wrong. In other instances, 
although assassinations are less brutal there are also signs of their being drug-related, as they 
are committed in illicit drug labs, in clandestine airports of drug leaders or by people related 
to known drug lords. 
 
Identifying relevant reports for each municipality 
In our search, we also made sure the reports referred to the exact municipality analyzed, and 
not to the state or an area under the same name but in another country.  
In some instances, we did not find a single hit when searching for the combination of 
municipality name and the above keywords of drug-related homicides. In these cases, we 
proceeded to check for the name of the municipality, its state and the keyword for drug-
related homicides.  
We also searched for the common names of municipalities, as some are abbreviated. 
For instance, the state commonly referred as Mexico, is officially known as the Estado de 
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Mexico. In a few cases the municipality has the same name as the state, such as 
Aguascalientes, the municipality, who is also in the state called Aguascalientes. In these 
instances, we specified in our Google search that our search was related to the municipality by 
searching for its commonly referred name, such as ‘Ciudad de Aguascalientes.’ 
If the municipality’s name is composed of two or more words, then we searched by its 
official name and also by its commonly shorted name. For instance, for the municipality 
officially called ‘Valle de Chalco’, we searched for both its official name and as its commonly 
known as ‘Chalco.’  
 
4. In case we failed to find evidence of drug-related homicides, we proceeded to search for 
other tell-tell signs of a cartel’s presence. Primarily, we look for a combination of area 
(municipality, state) and the cartel’s presence for a particular period. 
To this end, we searched the combination of name of the municipality and the word 
narco. If this initial search proved successful, we made sure that the mentioned area indeed 
corresponded to the municipality analyzed, and that the event suggested was indeed relevant 
to infer the cartels’ presence. If the initial combination of municipality and the word narco 
yielded no reports, or no relevant ones, we proceeded to search for combinations of the name 
of the municipality with the word drug cartel. If our search was unlucky, we then searched by 
the exact name of drug cartels. If that yielded unsuccessful results, we then searched directly 
for a combination of municipalities and the name or alias of the cartel’s leader. 
 
Identifying name of cartels and their leaders 
We took the reports of Guerrero-Gutiérrez (2011), Ravalo (2012), Coscia & Ríos (2012) and 
various online bulletins issued by Stratford as guidelines of the names of cartels and their 
leaders. So for instance, when searching for the combination of the municipality and the 
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Sinaloa cartel, we searched as a keyword Sinaloa cartel, as well as its known drug leaders 
such as Joaquín Guzmán Loera, “El Chapo, el chapo Guzman”, Ismael Zambada, “El Mayo”, 
Juan José Esparragoza Moreno and “El Azul”. 
 
5. If searching for specific drug cartels or drug leaders also proved unsuccessful, we then 
searched for specific cartel’s activities including drug trafficking, drug cultivation, drug 
seizing, arrests of cartel’s members, narco mantas (cartels’ messages  displayed in bed-
sheets), narco politicians (politicians associated with cartels), narco-police, army or gangs, 
and narco airports. 
 
6. After finding and reading a report where it was possible to infer cartels’ presence or drug-
related homicides, we copied at least one of the relevant links on to an Excel spread sheet. In 
cases where we found several links suggesting the presence of cartels in a particular 
municipality, we gave preferences to keeping at least one record of the links found in the 
following order of priority.  
 newspapers and specialized magazines,  
 online government reports,  
 links to videos, from TV-news  
 specialized blogs on drug-related themes 







Drug-related homicides 2000-2005 
According to our online search, 248 municipalities experienced drug-related homicides 
between January 2000 and December 2005, the period for where there are no official records 
on such homicides. As showed in Fig. B.1, most of these areas Osorio (2012) also identified 
as affected by drug violence during the same period.14 This reassures us that even though we 
did our online search manually and used different online sources, we found a similar 
geographical pattern as to where drug violence was reported. Ninety percent of the areas first 
affected by drug violence experienced again drug-related homicides between December 2006 
and September 2011 if triangulating with official records for that period.  
 
 
Fig. B.1 Municipalities experiencing drug-related homicides during 2000-2005 
 
 
Drug-related homicides 2006-2010 
The detection of which municipalities have experienced drug-related homicides has been 
greatly facilitated by the recently released official records (SNSP, 2011).  According to these 
records, 1,137 municipalities had at least one drug-related homicide during 2006-2010, the 
main period of our analysis.  
                                               
14 Osorio (2012) monitored 11 national newspapers; 47 local newspapers; and press releases 
from the army, navy, federal police and the Attorney General’s Office.  
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There were only 63 municipalities that according to our media search experienced 
drug-related homicides, but that do not appear in the official statistics of drug-related 
homicides. Since it is impossible to know the reason of discrepancy, we eliminate these 63 
areas with conflicting information from our analysis. We do so to minimize a potential 
contamination of our control groups and to keep a consistent definition of what is referred to 
drug-related homicides according to official records during 2006-2010.15 
 
Data on areas where cartels worked free of drug-related homicides  
To identify the areas where cartels have been active without instances of drug-related 
homicides we also surveyed online reports. We found 243 areas where cartels were active 
without instances of drug-related homicides between January 2000 and December 2005.16 We 
found another 145 areas had cartels working without instances of drug-related homicides from 
January 2006 until December 2010. According to our records, more than 90% of the areas 
where cartels operated free of drug-related homicides held the full monopoly of the plaza 
where they operated, as no other cartel was reported in the online records monitored. The 
correlation between having the monopoly of a plaza and not suffering from drug-related 
homicides has also been noted by other researchers (Castillo et al., 2012). In contrast, in areas 
experiencing drug-related homicides, we found two or more cartels battling for territory 




                                               
15 If we had included these 63 areas as treated areas by drug-related homicides our analysis would have offered 
same results as those presented, possible because most of these areas suffered quite low levels of drug-related 
homicides.  
16 This offers a similar number of areas affected by cartels to the one found by Coscia and Ríos (2012). 
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Appendix C: Data sources for socio-economic indicators 
 
Data on poverty, inequality, migration, unemployment, and industries 
We use Mexico’s official statistics on poverty, all available at the municipality level. Food 
poverty measures the percentage of the population that cannot buy a basic food basket. 
Capability poverty adds those who cannot cover health and education needs, while patrimony 
poverty adds those who cannot cover clothing, housing, and public transport needs. 
CONEVAL, an autonomous agency, estimated all these indicators by combining household 
surveys (Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto) with the Mexican Population Census using 
small-area statistics.17   
Population censuses are used to explore changes in migration patterns, changes in the 
total population, and the number of people who lived in another state five years ago. To have 
a sense whether migrants are running away from drug violence we estimate whether people 
migrated from a state that had an overall higher homicides rate than the one into which they 
migrated.  
We explore further internal migration patterns and profile of people that over previous 
five years relocated within the country using the 16% micro-census sample data of the 2005 
and 2010 censuses (since these indicators and profile were not publicly released).18 
Specifically, we assess the earning income of immigrants, whether higher or lower than the 
inhabitants of the area they moved into in the country.  
To measure changes in unemployment rates, we use population censuses of 2000 and 
2010, since this statistic is not available for 2005. To have a sense of which groups have been 
                                               
17 Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL) is in charge of evaluating 
indicators in Mexico to improve public policy in the country.  
18 This micro-data set is a sample of 16% of all records in the census, provided by INEGI in 
collaboration with the Minnesota Population Centre (2014).   
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most affected by unemployment, we also look at the unemployment rates according to 
people’s education attainment the 16% weighted sample of the 2000 and 2010 censuses.  
We also assess changes in the activity of two leading industries: manufacturing and 
wholesale trade drawing data from the economic censuses.  Specifically, we look at what 
happened, in net terms, to the overall production, profits, salaries per worker, number of 
workers, and establishments per 10,000 inhabitants. We do not analyze other industries, such 
as construction and finance where cartels are also rumored to use for money laundry, because 
the censuses do not distinguish in which areas their production took place. 
 
 
